

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION ACDA-12

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JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 BERN 802

DEPT PASS NCS FOR CDR. SICK

FOLLOWING IS THE PLENARY STATEMENT MADE BY AMBASSADOR
WARNKE:

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, XO
SUBJECT: US-USSR INDIAN OCEAN ARMS CONTROL TALKS: PLENARY
STATEMENT, FEBRUARY 17, 1978

PREPARED COMMENTS FOR 17 FEBRUARY 1978

TO DAY I WANT TO COVER THREE AREAS IN AN EFFORT TO
ASSESS WHERE WE ARE AND TO TRY TO PUT FUTURE ROUNDS
ON A FIRMER FOOTING.

FIRST, I WILL SUMMARIZE WHAT I BELIEVE TO HAVE BEEN
THE GENERAL RESULTS OF OUR FIRST THREE ROUNDS.

SECOND, I WILL NOTE THE AREAS OF
AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT DEVELOPED DURING THIS ROUND.

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THIRDLY, WE MUST DISCUSS THE MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE
INDIAN OCEAN DURING THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

THIS MORNING, MR. AMBASSADOR, I WOULD LIKE TO BEGIN BY
RECAPITULATING WHAT I BELIEVE TO BE THE GENERAL RESULTS OF
OUR FIRST THREE ROUNDS.

--TO BEGIN WITH BOTH PARTIES HAVE RECOGNIZED THEIR INTERESTS IN ACHIEVING PRACTICAL RESULTS BY STRENGTHENING PEACE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA AND IN CONTRIBUTING TO RELAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS IN THIS MANNER.

-- IN ADDITION, BOTH SIDES HAVE ADOPTED A STAGE-BY-STAGE APPROACH, WITH THE FIRST STEP BEING "STABILIZATION" FOLLOWED BY TALKS AIMED AT ACHIEVING MUTUAL REDUCTIONS.

-- FURTHERMORE, BOTH SIDES HAVE AGREED THAT THE FIRST STAGE SHOULD RESULT IN FREEZING MILITARY ACTIVITIES AT LEVELS OF THE RECENT PAST.

-- FINALLY, THE TWO SIDES HAVE STATED THEIR DESIRE TO PREVENT THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ARMS RACE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA.

ON THE WHOLE, IN THE FIRST THREE NEGOTIATING ROUNDS, WE MADE A GOOD START TOWARDS A STABILIZATION AGREEMENT. THIS REFLECTS THE FACT THAT BOTH SIDES DEMONSTRATED A SERIOUS APPROACH TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND HAVE MADE EFFORTS TO ACCOMMODATE THE VIEWS OF THE OTHER SIDE. ADDITIONALLY, BOTH SIDES TABLED DRAFTS OF AN AGREEMENT SO THAT WE COULD BEGIN WORKING ON A COMMON UNDERSTANDING.

-- WE ARE AT A POINT IN TIME WHERE BOTH SIDES MUST UNDERSTAND WHERE WE ARE AND WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN NEXT.

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-- FROM THE OUTSET, YOU HAVE STATED YOUR CONCERN THAT AN DEAL WITH STRATEGIC FORCES. WHILE WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS REDUCTIONS DURING THE FIRST STAGE, WE HAVE BEEN WILLING TO STATE THAT THE US HAS NOT DEPLOYED HEAVY BOMBERS TO THE INDIAN OCEAN AND THAT WE DO NOT CHALLENGE THAT US BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES HAVE NOT BEEN DEPLOYED IN THE INDIAN OCEAN ON A WIDE SCALE. WE HAVE ALSO SAID THAT WE WOULD NOT DEPLOY AN SSBN SUPPORT FACILITY. THIS IN ITSELF SHOULD BE EVIDENCE THAT THE US HAS NOT JUST TABLED BARGAINING POSITIONS BUT RATHER HAS PUT FORWARD REASONABLE POSITION IN AN EFFORT TO MEET YOUR PRINCIPAL CONCERN.

-- THIS SAME APPROACH HAS CHARACTERIZED PRACTICAL MATTERS. WE HAVE AGREED TO EXCLUDE TRANSITING VESSELS FROM RESTRICTIONS, TO CONSIDER A

LONGER TIME FOR TRANSITS (30 DAYS) THAN THAT REQUIRED BY OUR VESSELS (2 WEEKS) AND HAVE PROPOSED F14 DAYS FOR ROUTINE PORT CALLS, ALTHOUGH THE DURATION OF OUR OWN PORT CALLS IS CONSIDERABLY LESS. WE HAVE BEEN WHOLLY SERIOUS IN OUR EFFORTS TO ADVANCE THESE NEGOTIATIONS BY ACCOMMODATING YOUR

GOVERNMENT, TO THE DEGREE POSSIBLE, ON MATTERS OF BROAD PRINCIPLE AND OTHERS OF OPERATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE.

HOWEVER, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE OPPORTUNITY TO REACH AN AGREEMENT COULD SLIP AWAY UNLESS BOTH SIDES RETAIN THE SAME SERIOUSNESS AND CONSISTENT SENSE OF PURPOSE WHICH ACCOMPANIED EARLY ROUNDS.

WE FEEL STRONGLY THAT SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA AND THE RELATED BUILDUP OF SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA ARE NOT CONDUCTIVE TO INTERNATIONAL STABILITY AND EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION -- OUR STATED PURPOSE SINCE THE START OF TALKS AND EXPRESSED IN
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DIFFERENT WAYS IN OUR PROPOSED PREAMBLES. WE CANNOT DIS- SOCIATE THE REALITIES OF WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE HORN OF AFRICA FROM THE BASIC PURPOSE OF OUR ENTERPRISE HERE.

WORKING GROUPS

TURNING TO THE SECOND AREA, I INDICATED THAT I WOULD SUMMARIZE WHAT I BELIEVE TO BE THE MAJOR AREAS OF DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE AS DEVELOPED BY THE NAVAL EXPERTS GROUP AND THE EXPERTS GROUP ON DEFINITIONS.

AUXILIARIES - I AM PLEASED TO NOT THAT OUR NAVAL EXPERTS GROUP HAVE ACHIEVED AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE DEFINITION OF A NAVAL AUXILIARY

SHIP. THIS AGREEMENT IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR JUNE PROPOSAL, USING THE DEFINITION CONTAINED IN THE TREATY ON THE PREVENTION OF INCIDENTS AT SEA. OUR UNDERSTANDING IS AS FOLLOWS:

FOR THE UNITED STATES, NAVAL AUXILIARIES ARE THOSE SHIPS BEARING A RECOGNIZED HULL DESIGNATION AS SUCH AND CLASSIFIED AS NAVAL AUXILIARY SHIPS IN LISTINGS PROMULGATED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. THIS LISTING IS A PUBLISHED AND OPEN DOCUMENT AVAILABLE TO ALL NATIONS AND PROVIDES THE LEGAL STATUS FOR THESE SHIPS.

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DEPT PASS NCS FOR CDR. SICK

FOR THE SOVIET UNION, NAVAL AUXILIARIES ARE ALL NAVAL SHIPS AUTHORIZED TO FLY THE FLAG OF AUXILIARY SHIPS, SURVEY SHIPS, OR SALVAGE AND RESCUE SHIPS OF THE SOVIET NAVY. THIS INCLUDES ALL OF THE SHIPS AUTHORIZED TO FLY ONE OF YOUR VARIOUS NAVAL AUXILIARY FLAGS.

NOW THAT WE HAVE AGREED TO A DEFINITION, WE CAN MOVE ON TO THE PRIMARY ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT NAVAL AUXILIARIES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE AGREEMENT. ON THIS ISSUE WE ARE FAR APART. IT IS THE UNITED STATES POSITION THAT ALL OF THESE AUXILIARIES SHOULD BE COVERED IN THE AGREEMENT AND YOUR POSITION IS THAT THEY SHOULD ALL BE EXCLUDED. YOU HAVE HEARD OUR ARGUMENTS THAT SUPPORT ACTIVITIES, WHETHER ASHORE OR AFLOAT, SHOULD BE INCLUDED. OUR POSITION IS NOT INTENDED TO REDUCE EITHER SIDE'S SUPPORT ACTIVITY UNDER STABILIZATION BUT TO INCLUDE IT IN A MANNER THAT CONFORMS TO PAST LEVELS OF NAVAL SUPPORT OPERATIONS, WHETHER ASHORE OR AFLOAT, IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.

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TRANSITS - IN REGARD TO TRANSITS, BOTH SIDES HAVE AGREED ON THE RIGHT OF SHIPS TO TRANSIT THE AREA. WE NOTED IN THE EXPERTS GROUP THAT THERE IS FLEXIBILITY IN YOUR POSITION CONCERNING THE TIME LIMIT FOR SHIP TRANSITS. AS YOU KNOW, THE UNITED STATES CONCEPT OF ALLOWING AN EXEMPTION FROM THE AGREEMENT FOR SHIPS IN TRANSIT PRESUMES THAT THE TRANSIT WILL BE DIRECTED AND PROMPT WITHOUT THE USE OF THESE TRANSITING FORCES FOR MILITARY

ACTIVITIES SUCH AS FORMAL PORT VISITS.

FORCE MAJEURE - OUR EXPERTS HAVE REPORTED THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF FORCE MAJEURE IS UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED TO BY BOTH SIDES. IT REMAINS FOR US TO AGREE ON A MECHANISM FOR IMPLEMENTING FORCE MAJEURE. WE APPEAR TO BE VERY CLOSE TO FULL AGREEMENT ON THIS ISSUE.

EXPERTS ON DEFINITIONS

OUR EXPERTS ON DEFINITIONS HAVE REPORTED TO ME THAT WHILE THERE ARE AREAS OF AGREEMENT, THERE ARE CLEAR DIFFERENCES.

-- SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENTS

-- BOTH SIDES HAVE EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO USE SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENTS TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION CONCERNING THEIR PAST MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE AREA. NOW EACH SIDE UNDERSTANDS THE VIEW OF THE OTHER AND IS PREPARED TO WORK JOINTLY TO DEVELOP THE BEST PARAMETERS. THE BASIC REQUIREMENT IS THAT THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BE DETAILED ENOUGH TO PERMIT BOTH SIDES TO RECOGNIZE ACTIONS THAT SIGNIFICANTLY ALTER PREVIOUS LEVELS, COMPOSITION, AND PATTERNS OF MILITARY PRESENCE.

-- THIS REQUIREMENT POINTS UP THE NEED FOR A FAIR AND
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ACCURATE STANDARD BY WHICH WE CAN MUTUALLY JUDGE A STABILIZATION AGREEMENT. OUR POSITION IS THAT YOUR METHOD OF LIMITING FORCE LEVELS WOULD MAKE STABILIZATION MEANINGLESS IF USED BY YOU TO JUSTIFY YOUR CURRENT ACTIVITY. ADDITIONALLY, WE SEE A GREAT DEAL OF CONFLICT BETWEEN STABILIZATION AND A FORMULA WHICH WOULD ALLOW ONE SIDE TO CONCENTRATE (OR PEAK) NAVAL ACTIVITY AT THE START OF A YEAR. THE OTHER SIDE WOULD BE EXTREMELY UNCERTAIN UNTIL THE END OF THE YEAR ABOUT THE OTHER SIDE'S COMPLIANCE.

ON ROUTINE PORT CALLS,

THE U.S. HAS SUGGESTED A CLEAR DEFINITION OF A ROUTINE PORT CALL. THE SOVIET UNION HAS AGREED TO CONSIDER THIS, ESPECIALLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE U.S. POSITION THAT BOTH AFLOAT AND ASHORE SUPPORT FACILITIES SHOULD BE LIMITED BY THE AGREEMENT.

FROM THIS QUICK SUMMARY OF BASIC DIFFERENCES IN OUR RESPECTIVE POSITION IT IS OBVIOUS THAT WE ARE FAR APART ON SOME QUESTIONS, AND ON OTHERS, WE HAVE, OR ARE CLOSE TO HAVING, AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE.

MOREOVER, WE HAVE OTHER DIFFERENCES THAT LIE OUTSIDE THE

SUBSTANTIVE STRUCTURE AND APPEAR TO REFLECT SOMEWHAT DIVERGENT
POLITICAL VIEWS OF THE NEGOTIATION.

FIRST, WITH REGARD TO COUNTRIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
AREA, STATEMENT MADE BY YOU, AND YOUR COLLEAGUES
MR. AMBASSADOR, STILL APPEAR TO ASCRIBE TO LITTORAL STATES
A SINGLE COMMON VIEWPOINT THAT IS NOT AT ALL CONSISTENT WITH THE DI-
VERSITY OF ATTITUDES THAT WE FIND. OUR VIEW, AS I'VE SAID
BEFORE, IS THAT THIS NEGOTIATIONS IS BILATERAL AND THAT EACH SIDE,
INDEPENDENT OF THE OTHER, IS COMPETENT TO TAKE ADEQUATE ACCOUNT
OF THE SERIOUS AND CONTINUING INTERESTS OF LITTORAL AND OTHER
INTERESTED STATES.

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FOR SOMEWHAT SIMILAR REASONS WE DO NOT WISH TO REFER TO
THE INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE IN THIS AGREEMENT. THERE ARE
A VARIETY OF VIEWS ON THE NATURE OF SUCH A ZONE AND WHETHER OR
NOT IT IS DESIREABLE. OUR POLICY DOES NOT CORRESPOND WITH
YOURS, AND HENCE, WE DO NOT FIND AN AGREEMENT OF THIS NATURE
AN APPROPRIATE VEHICLE TO DEBATE THE MERITS OF THE IOZP
PROPOSAL.

A SECOND DIFFERENCE CONCERNS THE USE OF THE TERM "STABI-
LIZE" IN A PROVISION OF THE AGREEMENT THAT DESCRIBES OUR JOINT
INTENTION. WE FEEL THAT SINCE BOTH SIDES AGREE ON WHAT
PRIMARILY WE ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE, NEITHER OF US SHOULD BE
EMBARRASSED TO SAY IT FOR THE RECORD. WE HAVE NO WISH TO
SCATTER THE AGREEMENT WITH REFERENCES TO STABILIZATION, BUT
RATHER TO SPECIFY AT ONE APPROPRIATE PLACE IN THE TEXT THE
GOAL OF THIS PHASE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

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DEPT PASS NCS FOR CDR. SICK

I HAVE COVERED THE MAJOR AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT. I DO NOT INTEND TO DISCUSS EACH PROBLEM IN RELATION TO THE JOINT TEXT. THE POINT I DO WANT TO MAKE IS THAT THE PROBLEMS FACING US ARE NUMEROUS. THE JOINT TEXT WILL ENABLE US TO FOCUS ON THE AREAS OF DIVERGENCE WHEN WE RETURN HOME. HOWEVER, I HAVE TO OBSERVE THAT THE SPIRIT OF OUR ENTERPRISE, WHICH IS ABSOLUTELY CENTRAL, HAS BEEN CLOUDED BECAUSE OF CURRENT SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY.

CURRENT MILITARY ACTIVITY

EARLIER IN THIS ROUND OF TALKS, WE DISCUSSED THE CURRENT SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN IN LIGHT OF YOUR DESCRIPTION OF PAST SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE PRESENTED IN THE SEPTEMBER ROUND. IT IS APPARENT THAT THERE IS SOME MISUNDERSTANDING CONCERNING THE DESCRIPTION OF SOVIET FORCES GIVEN IN SEPTEMBER. WE VIEW THE CURRENT SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE AS A SIGNIFICANT ALTERA-
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TION OF PAST PATTERNS, AND YOU VIEW IT AS CONSISTENT WITH YOUR PREVIOUS LEVELS OF OPERATIONS.

YESTERDAY DURING THE MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP ON SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENTS, THE U.S. SIDE PROVIDED SOME INFORMATION ON ITS UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THE PREVIOUS PATTERN AND LEVEL OF SOVIET FORCES HAS BEEN AND HOW THE CURRENT LEVEL OF SOVIET FORCES DIFFERS FROM THIS. WE HOPE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WILL CAREFULLY STUDY THIS INFORMATION AND THAT IT WILL BE USEFUL IN OUR WORK IN DEVELOPING A METHOD TO DESCRIBE NAVAL PRESENCE. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE CURRENT LEVEL OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA IS AN INCREASE THAT IS INCONSISTENT WITH YOUR PREVIOUS PATTERN OF OPERATIONS.

AS I STATED EARLIER, EACH SIDE DEPLOYS FORCES TO THE INDIAN OCEAN BASED ON ITS OWN PERCEPTION OF HOW BEST TO

PROTECT ITS NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE AREA. THE DEPLOYED FORCES REFLECT ASYMMETRIES IN SHIP CHARACTERISTICS, AIR POWER, AUXILIARIES; SUCH ASYMMETRIES, IN TURN, REFLECT OUR RESPECTIVE APPROACHES TO MAINTAINING OUR NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN THIS REGION. IN OUR VIEW, STABILIZATION WILL RESULT IN UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR BOTH SIDES.

SINCE OUR PAST ROUNDS APPEAR TO HAVE DEMONSTRATED A SERIOUSNESS OF PURPOSE, WE MUST AVOID ALLOWING THE INDIAN OCEAN TO BECOME AN AREA OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT REMAINS CONVINCED THAT AN INDIAN OCEAN STABILIZATION AGREEMENT ALONG THE LINES WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING CAN SERVE BOTH SIDES' SECURITY INTERESTS. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE BEST, PERHAPS THE ONLY WAY TO REACH THIS AGREEMENT, MR. AMBASSADOR, IS FOR BOTH SIDES TO EXERCISE THE RESTRAINT THAT IS REQUIRED BY THE SPIRIT OF OUR ENTERPRISE.

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AS TO THE TIMING OF OUR NEXT MEETING, I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO ADDRESS THIS QUESTION NOW OR TO MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS. I AM SURE THAT OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS WILL CONSIDER THE MATTER AND BE IN TOUCH AT A LATER DATE TO WORK OUT ARRANGEMENTS.

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